Free Will
Christian
theology tells us that God can give his creatures free will, and
presumably he could also control their actions if he chose to, but he
cannot do both at the same time. God cannot simultaneously give a being
freedom of choice and withhold that freedom from it: God cannot carry out
both of two mutually exclusive alternatives any more than you or I can,
not because there is a limit to his power, but because nonsense remains
nonsense even when he speak it about God.
In general (again, according to most Christian theology) God chooses to
allow his creatures free will, rather than intervene. God apparently
considers free will to be a very good thing, good enough that it in some
sense outweighs all the evil that is caused by the abuse of free will.
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Gravity's Rainbow
The "holy grail" of
postmodernism is not some real space which escapes the symbolization of a
totalizing system - the existence of such spaces is given, is in a sense
the problem itself - but rather the discovery of some mode of discourse
which can embrace this heterogeniety of reality.
Let me use a specific example, one not actually part of the "discourse on
postmodernism", but one which is analogous:
As I understand it (and I trust any real physicists out there will correct
me if I'm wrong), a big problem facing modern physics now is the
inconsisteny that exists between quantum mechanics and general relativity.
As successful as both of these theories are in describing the universe at
certain scales (the very small for quantum mechanics and the very large
for relativity), the two theories are, strictly speaking, mutually
incompatable. A great deal of work is now being done to construct a
"Grand Unification Theory", in other words, a totalizing system beneath
which all of physical science could, at least in theory, be subsumed.
Now, my personal feeling - and here my opinion is typical of most
postmodern theory - is that such a project, while it may advance our
understanding of the universe, is ultimately doomed to failure. The
relationship between rationality and the universe, the relationship
between the symbolic and the real if you will, is such that our
representations will never be adequate. No theory of even the physical
universe will be entirely satisfactory, there will always be
inconsistencies, ruptures. Human reason is fundamentally incapable of
constructing a universally valid system, and thus all totalizing systems
will reveal some fundamental inadequecy.
Can I prove this? No, but history seems to support such a view.
Throughout history philosophers and scientists have attempted to construct
systems that would settle certain fundamental questions "once and for
all", but they have never succeeded. It is the very inadequecy of all
constructed systems that is the motive force behind the constant
production of new systems: this is the reason that we still have
philosophers and theoretical physicists, and the reason why these
disciplines still continue to "advance" in some sense or other.
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Paradox
I think that people like Derrida are saying _both_ "there can
be no totalizing theory" (in the sense that no totalizing theory will be
adequate or _true_) _and_ "we cannot avoid using totalizing theories".
It's a paradox which, when explored, generates huge amounts of abstract
discourse which, it would seem, gets us nowhere (e.g. Derrida's
_Differance_).
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Postmodernism
If you're interested in the "philosophically oriented stuff", you might
want to go straight to the "canonical" postmodern works ("canonical
postmodern" ought to be an oxymoron, but let's face it, it's not): Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean Baudrillard. Warning! Most of this stuff
is very dense and difficult.
If you're interested in the psycho-analytic strand of postmodernism,
Deleuze is good, and Lacan seems to be quoted by just about everyone,
though I've never read him.
Good preliminary reading to both of these strands of postmodern theory is
Ferdinand de Saussure ("Course on General Linguistics"). Saussure was the
originator of certain specialized terms that get used throughout
postmodern theory (namely "signifier", "signified", "sign", and
"referent"), and if you don't understand these terms as used by Saussure,
you will not understand (or will misunderstand) a lot of postmodern
theory.
None of the above-mentioned theorists (to the best of my knowledge)
actually use the term "postmodern", and as I said, they are very dense and
abstract. They are the most purely philosophical, though. If you're
interested in more cultural/philosophical (and also more contemporary)
work, some names you might check out are Frederic Jameson, Lyotard,
Habermas, and Zizek. Frederic Jameson's "Postmodernism, or, the Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism" is very good (I understand it's widely
considered THE seminal work on postmodernism, though I wouldn't really
know about that.)
I think your best bet would be to get a good anthology of essays. My
favorite is "The Anti-Aesthetic", edited by Hal Foster. This includes the
famous essay by Jameson and a very good one by Baudrillard. Some other
anthologies are "Universal Abandon?" and "Postmodernism and its
Discontents".
I would advise _against_ reading anything that claims to offer a summary
or overview of postmodernism, or even of any particular theorist within
the "movement" (if you can really call it that). These theories are very
subtle, and every attempt I've ever read at summarizing them ends up being
horribly reductive and at least partially misses the point. Don't, for
example, try to understand deconstructionism by reading Terry Eagleton's
"Literary Theory".
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Outlook
I think one of the more interesting tendencies in postmodernism is that
the distinction between "serious" and "fun" is being erased. Consider
Jameson's concept of "pastiche": is it funny? is it serious? the
question ceases to even make much sense.
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Kafka
Gregor Samsa turned into a bug. Why does that have to be a metaphore for
anything? It just happened. It is only the stupid, or the hopelessly
religious, who insist on seeing a 'meaning' in everything. Events in life
don't 'mean' anything, aren't 'metaphors' for anything. Why should events
in literature be any different? Gregor Samsa turned into an insect. So
what? It happened to me once. Spent an entire month scurrying along the
walls of my room, eating rotting vegetables and excreting brown fluid.
Unlike Samsa, I got better. A little better, at least. Just lucky, I
guess.
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Transcendence
Throughout this thread there has been the assumption that identity is a
real, objective property that a body possesses. It seems to me that the
question "which (of any two hypothetical duplicates/reconstructions/
simulations/etc.) is the _real_ you" is meaningless. You are assuming
that because we _perceive_ these past and present minds/bodies as
continuous, that they _really_are_ continuous, in some noumenal sense.
But the only meaningful definition of a mind or body "existing in the
past" is that of a mind or body existing as a _memory_ (i.e. construct) of
a _present_ mind. It is meaningless to ask which of two duplicate minds
is _really_ continuous with a past mind, for they are both constructing
similar past minds (i.e. they have the same memories). There is no
objective sense in which one is more continuous this past mind because
there is no objective sense in which this past mind actually exists: a
past mind is only a construct of present minds.
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Souls
There's a huge problem with saying that brains cause minds, unless we
assume that the causal power runs both ways (i.e., we implicitly assume a
dualist position). If the causal relationship only runs one way, then how
can we talk about minds at all? That is, how can minds manifest
themselves in the material universe - even in the form of discourse -
unless either a) minds and bodies (or some part of the body, such as the
brain) are not merely connected but are _the_same_thing, or b) minds have
some causal power within the physical universe. To say that qualia are
"epiphenomena" of physical processes is nonsense: if this were the case,
we could never discuss qualia.
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Marxism
Part of the reason we don't discuss Marx is because in many ways
postmodernism was a revolt _against_ the older generation of Marxists that
had become a dominating force in the liberal sectors of academia around
the 50s and 60s. In many ways, Marxism is the modernist historical theory
_par_excellence_. I'm not saying that this is a reason not to read him.
In fact this is a reason _to_ read him, because in many ways one can't
understand postmodernism until one understands modernism (and even
vice-versa). But this _is_ a reason why one wouldn't want to put him down
as a "postmodern" thinker.
I don't know much about Marxist theory, so correct me if what I say is
incorrect, but as I understand it, "historical materialism" is precisely
that sort of meta-narrative which Lyotard defines as the antithesis of
postmodernism. Moreover, "historical materialism" is not only a
meta-narrative, but a _teleological_ one at that. These days, most people
will just laugh at you if you try to say that there is actually a
"purpose" to history.
As for "postmodern" refutations of historical materialism, see Lyotard.
For a not-so-postmodern refutation, see C.S. Lewis's essay "On
Historicism". I believe it's in the collection called "The Seeing Eye".
The similarities between C.S. Lewis and postmodernists like Lyotard are in
many cases striking.
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Dreams of a Physicist
Isn't it meaningless to talk of the Big Bang's being "caused"? Presumably
causation is dependant on a temporal dimension (i.e. Time), and presumably
there "was" no temporal dimension before the Big Bang. There wasn't
really a "before" the Big Bang, since time didn't exist "back then",
right?
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Dead Can Dance
Okay, having made a substantial investment in owning all five DCD import
CDs, here are my reviews, in approximately chronilogical order:
_Dead Can Dance_ (which includes _Garden of the Arcane Delights_):
Excellent, though much more goth-rock than any of their later stuff. If
you like bauhaus at all, you'll LOVE this album. Even if you don't like
bauhaus, you'll probably love this album. Also the only album (I think,
could be wrong though) where Lisa Gerrard sings in English (though you
still can't understand what she's saying).
_Spleen And Ideal_:
I'd say this is their worst album, though it's still pretty good.
Somewhat reminiscent of early Cocteau Twins.
_Serpent's Egg_:
Very, very Good. Mostly Lisa Gerrard vocals, though the three Brendan
Perry tracks are good. Very orchestral and gothic (in the medieval
sense).
_Within The Realm of a Dying Sun_:
Excellent. Brendan Perry does the vocals for the first half of the album,
and Lisa Gerrard does the vocals for the second half. Anywhere Out of the
World is typical of the first half. The second half is just incredible
though! It's similar to _Serpent's Egg_, but even more orchestral and
instense. If I had to recommend just one album, it would probably be this
one.
_Aion_:
Excellent. Howard Goodman was probably thinking about this one in
particular, though, when he called the later Dead Can Dance "too
retrogressive and esoteric". It's definitely their least modern sounding,
containing straight covers of medieval and rennaisance music. If you're
not used to this sort of thing, it can take a couple of listenings before
you really appreciate it, but believe me, it's well worth the effort. I
actually think this is my favorite.
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Spirituality
Computer programs are essentially
deterministic, whereas Christian theology tells us that human beings are
essentially free.